This proposal is not new. I first submitted the case for an Office of National Resilience to government in March 2025, when the UK’s vulnerabilities were visible but still treated as peripheral. In the ten months since, the global environment has continued to become more unstable, the definition of a “reasonable worst case” has shifted, and the gap between local resilience and national defence remains. The UK lacks a single, accountable body to prepare for the most consequential risks — those that cross boundaries, cascade across sectors and threaten national continuity. The need for an Office of National Resilience is now a strategic imperative.
Executive summary
The United Kingdom faces growing strategic risk from shifting alliances, fragile supply chains, hybrid threats and critical technological dependencies. Local resilience teams focus on the most likely risks because they must. National defence focuses on military threats because that is its mandate. Between them lies a critical gap: the resilience required to withstand the most consequential events — those that cross boundaries, cascade across sectors and threaten national continuity.
This gap is widening as the global environment becomes more unstable. What once counted as a “reasonable worst case” is rapidly changing. The UK lacks a single, accountable body to prepare for these high‑impact risks, verify national readiness, or coordinate the civilian, infrastructural and societal resilience required to withstand systemic shocks.
Resilience is not only a protective measure — it is a form of deterrence. A nation that can absorb disruption, maintain continuity and recover quickly is far harder to coerce or destabilise. Visible resilience strengthens national security by shaping the calculations of adversaries and reducing the appeal of hybrid or asymmetric attacks.
This paper proposes the creation of an Office of National Resilience with Cabinet level authority to set standards, verify preparedness, coordinate cross-sector action and engage the public in practical preparedness. The Office will champion seven core foundations: strategic coordination and oversight; communications and public engagement; food and energy security; technology sovereignty and resilience; industrial capability and manufacturing resilience; education and workforce mobilisation; and civil defence and shelter infrastructure.
The UK needs a visible, accountable national body to lead resilience across government, industry and civil society — not as a bureaucratic exercise, but as a strategic necessity.
Problem statement
Current resilience arrangements are fragmented and low profile. Responsibilities are dispersed across departments and agencies, with limited public engagement and no single body empowered to verify claims or drive cross-sector standards. This fragmentation leaves the country exposed in multiple domains.
- Energy and food – over-reliance on global supply chains and single-source suppliers increases vulnerability to disruption.
- Technology – critical software and hardware dependencies can be subject to political interference or supply-chain failure.
- Manufacturing – loss of domestic capability in strategic sectors undermines crisis response capacity.
- Civil preparedness – warning systems, shelter infrastructure and community readiness are underdeveloped.
- Workforce – age discrimination and under-utilisation of experienced workers reduce national capacity to respond.
These weaknesses are symptoms of a deeper structural issue: the UK lacks a national body responsible for preparing for the most consequential risks — those that sit between local resilience and national defence.
The Missing Middle: Local Resilience, National Defence, and the Gap Between Them
Across the UK, local resilience forums, emergency planning teams and city-level partnerships – such as the London Resilience Forum – work hard to strengthen preparedness within their communities. These organisations are staffed by committed professionals who understand the risks and are doing what they can within the constraints they face. However, their remit forces them to prioritise the most likely risks, not the most consequential. With limited resources, competing local pressures and short-term political cycles, they cannot plan for low-probability, high-impact events that would overwhelm local boundaries.
At the other end of the spectrum, national defence sits with the Ministry of Defence and its partners. Their focus is rightly on military threats, strategic deterrence and the protection of national sovereignty. But the MoD is not structured, mandated or resourced to lead whole-of-society resilience, nor to coordinate the civilian, infrastructural and societal preparedness required for systemic shocks. Crucially, national resilience is not only about protecting and enabling society — it is also essential to supporting the effectiveness of the UK’s defence posture. A nation that can maintain continuity of government, sustain critical infrastructure, protect its population and absorb disruption is far better positioned to support military operations, uphold deterrence and withstand coercion.
Between these two poles lies a critical gap: the resilience required to withstand the most impactful events – those that cross boundaries, cascade across sectors and threaten national continuity. Historically, these risks were considered unlikely. Today, what constitutes a “reasonable worst case” is shifting rapidly. Geopolitical instability, technological dependency, supply-chain fragility and hybrid threats mean that events once deemed improbable are now plausible, and those once considered extreme are now within the realm of expectation.
No existing body is empowered, visible, and accountable to prepare for these cross-boundary, cross-sector, high-impact scenarios. Local teams cannot do it. The MoD is not designed to do it. And without a national advocate, these risks fall between institutional cracks.
An Office of National Resilience would fill this missing middle. It would ensure that the UK prepares not only for the events we expect, but for the events that would matter most — the ones that test national cohesion, infrastructure and sovereignty. By setting standards, verifying preparedness and coordinating action across government, industry and civil society, the ONR would provide the leadership required to address the risks that no single department or local authority can manage alone.
Local resilience forums are essential, and national defence is essential – but neither can deliver national resilience on their own. The UK needs a dedicated national body to lead, support and integrate the work required to withstand the most consequential risks.
Resilience as Deterrence
A resilient nation is harder to coerce, disrupt or destabilise.
While covert resilience measures protect the country quietly, overt resilience is a strategic signal — a visible demonstration that the UK can absorb shocks, maintain continuity and recover quickly. This visibility strengthens national deterrence by shaping the calculations of adversaries and reducing the appeal of hybrid or asymmetric attacks.
Modern deterrence is no longer defined solely by military capability. It is multi‑domain, spanning energy, food, technology, communications, manufacturing, civil defence and societal cohesion. When these systems are visibly robust, diversified and well‑coordinated, the cost of attempting disruption increases significantly.
An Office of National Resilience would play a central role in projecting this strength. By setting standards, verifying preparedness and publishing transparent assessments, the ONR would demonstrate that the UK is not a soft target and cannot be easily destabilised through supply‑chain interference, cyber disruption, misinformation, or pressure on critical infrastructure.
Covert resilience protects us.
Overt resilience deters those who would test us.
A nation that can withstand disruption is far less likely to face it. By embedding resilience across government, industry and civil society — and by making that resilience visible — the UK strengthens its sovereignty, reduces strategic vulnerability and enhances its ability to navigate an increasingly unstable world.
To achieve this level of visible, coordinated resilience, the UK requires a dedicated national institution with the authority to lead, verify and champion preparedness.
Proposal
Establish an Office of National Resilience as a permanent, Cabinet-level agency with a public mandate to strengthen the UK’s ability to prevent, withstand and recover from systemic shocks. The Office will set national resilience standards, verify implementation across central and local government, coordinate cross-sector preparedness, and lead national programmes that strengthen infrastructure and social capacity.
Mission
To embed resilience across government, industry and society by setting standards, verifying delivery, coordinating action and empowering citizens with practical preparedness.
Core remit
- Define national resilience standards and measurable targets.
- Independently verify departmental and local resilience claims and publish findings.
- Coordinate cross-sector contingency planning and strategic projects.
- Lead public engagement campaigns and support local resilience forums.
- Sponsor strategic projects in food security, technology hardening and manufacturing resilience.
- Mobilise and retrain experienced workers for resilience roles.
Core foundations
Strategic coordination and oversight
A single accountable body to set priorities, publish targets and prevent fragmented effort across departments and local authorities.
Communications and public engagement
National campaigns and trusted two-way channels that explain practical steps citizens can take, normalise preparedness and build public confidence.
Food and energy security
Cross-departmental coordination to define minimum national food supply standards, accelerate domestic production where feasible, and plan energy resilience through diversification and strategic reserves.
Technology sovereignty and resilience
Assess and reduce critical software and hardware dependencies, fund projects to harden supply chains and support sovereign alternatives for government and critical infrastructure where necessary.
Industrial capability and manufacturing resilience
Identify and preserve strategic manufacturing capabilities through targeted incentives, stockpiles and supplier diversification to ensure domestic capacity for essential industries.
Education and workforce mobilisation
Introduce resilience awareness into the national curriculum and tertiary education, promote resilience training in business, and remove barriers to workforce participation to mobilise experienced talent.
Civil defence and shelter infrastructure
Modernise warning systems, test them regularly, develop shelter guidance and expand local resilience forums with practical training so communities can support each other in crises.
Governance and accountability
- Cabinet oversight — a named senior minister sponsor and Cabinet reporting line to ensure political visibility and decision‑making authority.
- Independent verification — an independent audit unit to verify departmental and local resilience claims and publish transparent findings.
- Local partnership — regional resilience boards to coordinate local delivery and community engagement.
- Transparency — public dashboards and an annual resilience index to track progress and maintain public trust.
- Statutory remit and funding — a clear statutory mandate and stable funding to enable the Office to set standards and commission strategic projects.
Benefits
- Stronger national security by reducing single-point dependencies and strategic vulnerabilities.
- Greater public confidence through clear guidance, visible leadership and practical support.
- Improved societal resilience as citizens, businesses and communities adopt practical preparedness measures.
- Economic stability by protecting critical manufacturing and supply chains.
- Flexible workforce mobilisation by tapping under-utilised skills and experience.
Call to action
Endorse the principle of an Office of National Resilience and commission a cross-departmental review to define remit, governance and initial priorities. Begin a public consultation and stakeholder engagement process with industry, local authorities, education leaders and civil society to shape the Office’s mandate. Establish the Office with Cabinet reporting, publish a national resilience audit and launch pilot programmes in food contingency, technology hardening and community resilience training.